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THE BRITISH INITIATIVE IN ULSTER 
by Michael McDowell 
The British will soon unveil detailed plans to restore devolved government to 
Northern Ireland.' Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, encouraged by her successful 
efforts in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, is determined to apply the same skills in Ulster. 
But can she achieve a Rhodesia-type settlement there? The search for agreement 
in that part of the U.K. officially began on January 7, 1980, when the British 
convened a conference of the main political parties in Belfast. 
One seasoned Ulster politician observed then: "Ulster is more difficult to 
resolve than Rhodesia, with its own peculiar problems which have existed for 
centuries. This could be one conflict the Tories can't sort out quickly. And 
remember that our terrorists, unlike Robert Mugabe's, aren't mollified by free 
elections — we have those. I am sure of one thing", he went on. "The Tories 
are going to act — to impose some sort of 'solution' whether the local leaders 
can agree or not. Whether we work that 'solution' is the real test for us and for 
the British." 
The venue for the 1980 talks was the grandiose Parliament building at 
Stormont, perched high in the hills cradling the city. Much the same cadre of 
politicians trooped down its ghost-filled corridors to the conference room, 
situated a tempting few yards away from the old debating chamber which 
housed previous efforts at devolution — the Northern Ireland Convention of 
1976, the Ulster Assembly of 1974 and the old majority-rule parliament pro-
rogued in 1972. The belief that something must, and more importantly, can be 
done now to answer the Irish Question separates the Conservatives from their 
Labour predecessors who concluded that direct-rule of Ulster from London, 
with British Ministers in Belfast, was the only acceptable alternative to widening 
dissent among the sectarian groupings of Northern Ireland. 
Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan, and his Ulster Secretary, Roy 
Mason, were faced with Protestant politicians demanding a return to the old 
majority-rule-minority-exclusion system of government, versus Catholic politi-
cians' insistence on reserved places in any Government with a recognition of, or 
commitment on all-Ireland links — the so-called "Irish Dimension" of Ulster 
politics. The Labour Government's reluctance to pursue political movement was 
encouraged by their minority position in the Westminster Parliament — where 
the swing-votes of Ulster's Unionist MPs partly held them prisoner. 
The Conservatives have adopted a far more activist Ulster policy, abandon-
ing an earlier election manifesto pledge to increase powers of local town councils 
in Northern Ireland and bring closer integration with the rest of the U.K. The 
councils, mainly Protestant-dominated, have a record of discrimination in 
public housing in the past and although they no longer have control of that, 
several have been charged with sectarian appointments to local government 
jobs. The Tories' original election pledge was essentially the brainchild of Mrs. 
Thatcher's then Ulster spokesman, Airey Neave, and designed to placate 
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Protestant politicians. Neave favoured a tougher security policy and was 
regarded with considerable suspicion by Catholic and centre leaders. But he was 
murdered in a skilful IRA car-bomb attack as he drove from the House of 
Commons in April 1979. 
Neave's death — he was a close personal friend of Mrs. Thatcher — hardened 
her conviction that something had to be done in Ulster, and the murder only 
four months later in the Irish Republic, of Lord Mountbatten, followed barely 
hours after that by the killing of eighteen British soldiers in Warrenpoint, 
Northern Ireland (the biggest single Army fatality in the history of the troubles), 
added to her determination to deal with the Irish problem, even in the face of 
local intransigence. She appointed former Chief Whip Humphrey Atkins, a 
softer, more conciliatory politician than Neave, as Northern Ireland Secretary. 
Mrs. Thatcher's first priority, however, was a Zimbabwe-Rhodesia settlement, 
but Lord Carrington's early success there pushed Ulster higher up the political 
agenda. Anxious to stymie pressure from Catholic Irish-American politicians 
such as Senators Kennedy and Moynihan, Speaker O'Neill and Governor 
Carey, who had accused the former Labour administration of "tilt" in favour of 
the Protestants, Mrs. Thatcher pushed her Ulster Secretary to produce an early 
initiative timed to precede her first official U.S. visit in early December. 
She arrived in the U.S. armed with the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia settlement and 
able to tell President Carter that her Ulster conference was set to begin with not 
only the (Catholic) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), but Ian 
Paisley's hard-line Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the moderate centre 
party, Alliance, taking part. The initiative, however, was almost stillborn. 
Written in haste by civil servants, some of whom had only a few months' service 
in Ulster, it firmly ruled out any discussion of the "Irish Dimension" — a rebuff 
for the SDLP. 
Although, when the conference working-paper was unveiled in the 
Commons, SDLP leader Gerry Fitt gave a general welcome to the document, 
his enthusiasm was not shared by his party colleagues. Just a few days later, they 
voted to reject the British conference, as it stood. Fitt resigned and was replaced 
by the less-compromising Euro-MP John Hume, who insisted on an "Irish-
Dimension" in any discussions. The initiative seemed doomed to failure, since 
the main Protestant Party, the Official Unionists, heavily influenced by Enoch 
Powell (an Englishman who is now an Ulster MP), had already decided to 
boycott the conference and pressed the Tories to implement their original 
election pledge to reform local government. They expected Protestant hard-
liner, the Reverend Ian Paisley, to boycott too, but Paisley, to everyone's 
astonishment, and suspicion, announced he would go to the talks. 
Ian Paisley, who built his political following and reputation on his uncom-
promising stands not only against Irish unity but on his adamant rejection of 
minority politicians in a Northern Ireland administration, had worked to make 
all previous constitutional talks between the two communities fail. He had, 
before, stayed outside such meetings, attacking them as Trojan horses for Irish 
unity. Paisley's very involvement in these talks breathed new life into a British 
initiative which, until then, had been perceived as a cosmetic exercise to lessen 
pressures for "action" from the Irish Republic and the U.S.A. The talks could 
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not have gone ahead with both the Official Unionists and Paisley refusing to 
participate — the British had won one party over if not the other. But why was 
Paisley taking part? One hardened minority politician commented at the start of 
the talks: "Paisley is a short-term tactician. His whole object is not to achieve 
agreed government but to outflank his Protestant rivals, the Official Unionists, 
so ably led astray by Enoch Powell. Paisley's new image of reconciler will revert 
to type in a few months. Paisley has achieved quite a coup by being the only 
significant Protestant leader in these talks and he will increase his electoral 
support as a result because most Protestants are unhappy with the Official 
Unionist boycott of this conference." 
Paisley's huge (30%) vote in the elections to the European Parliament had 
boosted his political confidence immeasurably and he spoke of himself as the 
new leader of the Protestant people. His plurality encouraged him to take part in 
the talks without being in danger of a "sell-out" on unity accusation. And, some 
optimists argued, his participation really meant he would accept some govern-
mental structure where Catholic politicians would have a significant role. He 
was convinced, others claimed, that Mrs. Thatcher's conference would indeed be 
the last chance, for a long time, to achieve devolution for Northern Ireland. 
The (Catholic) SDLP, were eventually persuaded to go to the conference with 
an assurance from Atkins that the Irish Dimension could be discussible in 
"parallel talks" where the SDLP could more fully raise the question of Irish 
unity, through examination of cross-border economic cooperation, European 
community affairs, etc. Paisley refused to attend these secondary deliberations, 
but, significantly, did not withdraw from the main conference. John Hume used 
the conference to ensure SDLP policy was getting clearly through to Mrs. 
Thatcher, via Atkins, in the main conference and parallel talks. Prior to the 
conference, the SDLP felt their views were being ignored. Hume sees the present 
discussions as only one step in a long process to tackle the Northern Ireland 
problem. 
He believes that the "British Guarantee" — stating that Ulster will remain 
part of the U.K. for as long as a majority there wish to do so (the cornerstone of 
British policy) — prevents Unionists from having to accept Catholics in govern-
ment, encourages them to pursue fuller integration with the rest of Britain and 
prevents dialogue not only in Ulster between the two communities but between 
Ulster and the Republic. The SDLP ask for the guarantee to be removed and 
demand the involvement of the Southern-Irish Government in any initiative. 
Cabinet posts must be reserved for the SDLP in any new Ulster administration, 
they insist. 
Paisley's stand brought the talks to an earlier adjournment. He refused to 
consider power-sharing in government with the SDLP, demanding a return to 
the old majority-rule system which operated in Ulster for fifty years. As a sop, 
he offered minor safeguards of minority rights and a subordinate committee 
system with legislative and investigative functions but no reserved places for the 
Catholics. In an atmosphere of uncompromising finality, Paisley declared: 
"Power-sharing is out — now, and for all time." An Alliance party delegate 
concluded: "At that point, the talks became 'Supermick' (the SDLP) versus 
'Superprod' (Paisley)." During the talks, Paisley had difficulties keeping his 
37 « 
rank and file in line — never a problem in the past. Some critics say he was 
prepared to concede more to the SDLP but was prevented from doing so by 
party extremists. 
The (centre) Alliance party — which captured a 14 percent moderate 
Protestant-Catholic vote in the last local government elections — advocated 
power-sharing in government through executive committees, with party leaders 
placed in office in proportion to party strengths. They came down against any 
institutionalised Irish Dimension, while recognising the importance of 
economic, European Community and other links with the Irish Republic. 
"So, now we know," an SDLP leader said after the adjournment, "there is 
absolutely no chance of an agreement being thrashed out among us. Paisley has 
shown that. It's up to the Brits now. But the talks haven't been a waste of time 
— it's important to influence what the British may come up with. Our positions 
are clear." Even before the already fragile talks began there was a further 
complicating factor — the appointment of a new Southern-Irish premier in 
succession to moderate Jack Lynch. Charles Haughey — once charged, and 
later acquitted, of running guns to the IRA only a decade ago — was the new 
leader of the government party. 
Haughey maintained a deafening silence on Northern Ireland and the IRA 
while he sojourned in the political wilderness — he was dismissed from the 1970 
Cabinet and gradually worked his way back into prominence, emerging in 
December as premier. On the day of his election as party leader and premier, 
Haughey did however condemn the IRA forthrightly. Lynch had put internal 
agreement in Ulster as the first priority. Irish unity or commitments on it were 
secondary. Haughey is more hawklike. He stated at his party conference that 
Northern Ireland as a political entity had failed and that it was up to the British 
and Southern-Irish governments to sort out the problem. Agreement in 
Northern Ireland was only a half-way stage to the "final solution" — Irish unity 
— and Haughey has asked the British to declare an interest in unity. Impor-
tantly, he did not call for British withdrawal and at the moment, his first priority 
is not Northern Ireland, despite his public statements, but the ailing Irish 
economy. 
Haughey appealed to the Ulster Protestants to consider unity as in their long-
term interest but he has not offered one inducement — no mention of such 
reforms in the Irish Republic as civil divorce (banned under the Southern 
Constitution), removing severe restrictions on contraceptive services, or 
dropping a territorial claim to Northern Ireland. He faces a general election in 
more than a year's time. If he wins that — the strength of the economy will be 
the test — Haughey could take a much harder line on Ulster. The British have 
only that long to move towards an internal settlement without facing his 
censure. 
When the British initiative was first launched on November 20, its purpose 
was to "find the highest possible level of agreement," among the parties. It was 
referred to, at first, by civil servants and the Secretary of State, as the 
"constitutional conference." But the word "constitutional" was later dropped. 
Increasingly, the phrases, "identifying areas of agreement and disagreement," 
then, later, "a first step in search of agreement" crept into speeches and state-
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ments of the British Ministers. The Tories and their civil servants have changed 
the nomenclature further. They don't talk of "imposed formulas" any longer 
but of "giving a lead." "The Government used the conference as a listening 
post," said one participant, "refining down what the different parties would 
accept or reject and trying to arrive at a middle course system which neither side 
will like but which most might accept." 
Following the adjournment of the conference, a special Cabinet committee 
comprised of Ulster Secretary Atkins, Defence Secretary Francis Pym (himself 
briefly Ulster Secretary in a previous administration), Lord Carrington, the 
Foreign Secretary, Home Secretary Whitelaw (the first Ulster Secretary 
appointed) and Lord Hailsham, the Lord Chancellor, examined the conference 
report in detail. They produced proposals narrowing down the options for their 
report to Parliament. Atkins will then reconvene the Ulster conference, discuss 
the ideas with the local parties and widen the scope of the discussions to include 
the smaller parties and groupings such as the trade unions, business community, 
etc. He is planning on participation again, by Paisley and Alliance. Whether the 
SDLP or Official Unionists will attend, remains to be seen. After these con-
sultations are complete, the government should unveil its proposals for Ulster 
devolution by early autumn and prepare legislation for December or January for 
incorporation in the Queen's Speech to Parliament. The proposals should be 
enacted by February and a referendum or election prepared for Easter or by 
June 1981. But what will those final proposals be? 
It is likely that the British will settle for a middle road between the parties — 
possibly a committee system of government along the Alliance party's sugges-
tions, with reserved positions in an executive for both the SDLP and Alliance. 
Government powers would be increasingly given back to local politicians if they 
showed a willingness to compromise with one another. Whether there will be an 
Irish Dimension is problematic. If there is, and if, eventually, most of the parties 
agree to work the system, that Irish Dimension, if present at all, will have to be 
weak — if the Protestant politicians are not to be driven away. The British could 
face threatened and actual boycotts of their proposals by the SDLP and the 
Official Unionists and Paisley. Their dilemma is to get acceptance or tolerance 
— not support — for the system they select. 
One way round that dilemma would be to hold a referendum on their pro-
posals, going to the people for support. They might be encouraged by polls 
inidcating that 70 percent of Protestants would go for power-sharing with 
Catholic politicians in government — although those same Protestants would 
not contemplate a significant Irish Dimension. If the referendum won a Yes-
vote, all the politicians would run for the subsequent election. If the British 
could, instead of removing their guarantee to the majority (a highly dangerous 
exercise to indulge in which would only inflame Protestant opinion, not 
moderate it), spell out the CONDITIONS of that guarantee, that is, power-
sharing with Catholic leaders, they could meet with success. Protestants would 
probably trust Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservatives more than her Labour 
predecessors. 
But a referendum could backfire on the British. It has often been said that the 
people vote against things in Ulster rather than for them. If Paisley or the 
Unionists or the SDLP actively campaigned against the British package 
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labelling it a sell-out to one side or another, the whole initiative could be 
doomed. The 1974 power-sharing executive was critically weakened by Paisley's 
campaign against its Irish Dimension, for example. Certainly, Alliance and the 
British Government, through Mrs. Thatcher and Atkins with his Ministers in 
Belfast, could campaign FOR the measures and try to boost support for them in 
a referendum — but they could lose against the scare-tactics of the other local 
politicians. 
A referendum may be a gamble the British should not take, and they will 
probably go for an election instead in Spring, 1981. If devolution for Ulster fails 
again by 1981, time could run out for the people of Northern Ireland. 
Direct-rule may be an acceptable alternative to a majority in both communities 
but it is seen as a short-term operation. Pressure for the British to do something 
— however unwise such actions would be — will build from the Irish Republic, 
from Britain, from America, from Europe. 
By the perceptions of republicans in the Republic and the USA, "doing some-
thing" would mean moving to Irish unity and British withdrawal. Pursuing unity 
against the wishes of the Northern Ireland majority is a sure recipe for a civil 
war where the death toll would rise well beyond the present 2,000 plus. Attempts 
to bring about Irish unity under duress can only result in a geographical unity — 
if not repartition — but the Catholics and Protestants of Ireland would be 
further apart than ever. And that is why getting devolved government in Ulster 
between now and 1982 is more than a priority — it is a necessity. 
Footnotes 
1. A Green (Consultative) Paper was issued by the UK Government on July 2nd 1980. 
SOME LIGHT ON OUR DARKNESS 
by Dominick Graham 
The public was confused by the reaction of Western leaders to the invasion of 
Afghanistan. For when public figures spoke of raising defence budgets and send-
ing U.S. Marine Corps and carrier units to the Indian Ocean they seemed to be 
suggesting that war was imminent. Then, as shares on the stock exchanges rose 
with the new popularity of the President of the United States, the media told the 
public that the President had been electioneering. And it appeared that the 
presidential political advisers were right, for the people responded immediately 
to an issue that they could get their teeth into — a good, old-fashioned case of 
aggression. The scenery was familiar from 1939, when the Germans marched 
into Poland, and 1950, when the North Koreans crossed the 38th parallel. Those 
were wars, those were, and easy to understand. Not like this motley, half peace 
half war, they called détente. 
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